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Abstract: 
In this analysis of Australia’s superannuation arrangements it is our conjecture that 
the structure and conduct of the retail superannuation industry in Australia directly 
impacts performance, resulting in the delivery of costly funds management products 
which add minimal value for investors over the long term.  In this study, we take the 
perspective of an investor faced with selecting a retail superannuation fund, and 
explore the extent to which various differentiating characteristics (such as style, 
rating and cost) provide insights into fund quality which uses a variety of asset 
pricing models for the period 1991 through 2003.  The results of this study, suggest 
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 I I In n nt t tr r ro o od d du u uc c ct t ti i io o on n n     
After the family home, superannuation retirement savings are the most important 
financial asset for Australians, and, within this sector, retail superannuation funds are the 
fastest growing type of investment vehicle (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
[APRA], 2003).
1  The structure of Australia’s system of superannuation, characterised by 
compulsory contribution (under the Superannuation Guarantee Levy [SGL]) and 
preservation, has resulted in a burgeoning marketplace for funds management services.
2  
The conduct of fund managers, providing superannuation investment products to retail 
investors, reflects the behaviour of agents under conditions of monopolistic competition – 
output is characterised by relatively high costs, limited differentiation, and an emphasis on 
advertising and marketing.
3  The conduct of fund managers has particular relevance to the 
current debate surrounding member choice in superannuation, as such industry 
characteristics may erode the potential welfare benefits of any such policy. 
 
It is our conjecture that the structure of Australia”s superannuation system and conducts 
of the retail superannuation funds management industry, directly impact performance, 
resulting in the delivery of costly retail products which add minimal value for investors 
over the long term.  In this study, we take the perspective of an investor faced with 
selecting a retail superannuation fund, and explore the extent to which various 
differentiating characteristics (such as asset selection style [style], fund rating [rating], 
and management expense ratios [cost]) provide insights into fund quality.
4  The results of 
this study suggest that investors cannot garner superior risk-adjusted returns through 
reliance on such differentiating characteristics. 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm is a model of industrial organisation 
which allows for the analysis of industry performance in the light of its organisational 
structure and behavioural characteristics.  This model has been used to examine the 
mutual funds industry in the United States (Davis and Steil, 2001) and Europe (Otten and 
Schweitzer, 2002), but is yet to be used as a framework for analysis in the Australian 
context.  In this study, the SCP paradigm is used to analyse the unique characteristics of 
Australia”s highly regulated and increasingly complex superannuation system and the 
resultant performance of fund managers within the retail environment.
5
                                                      
1   In terms of growth in assets under management (APRA, 2003). 
 
2    The SGL requires that all employers make contributions, initially equivalent to 3% of Ordinary Time 
Earnings in 1992–93 and increasing to 9% in 2002–03, to superannuation on behalf of each employee.  
Employers are entitled to a tax deduction for these contributions, which are taxed at 15% on entry to 
the superannuation environment and are subject to preservation rules.  An estimated 88% of all workers 
are covered by the SGL, with an estimated balance of AUD 70,000 per member (APRA, 2003). 
 
3   For the purposes of this study, retail investors are those who do not invest on a professional basis.  The 
industry definition generally excludes those with less than $100,000 to invest; ‘wholesale’ investments 
are generally offered at approximately half the cost of retail investments and are generally not offered as 
superannuation vehicles. 
 
4   For an excellent survey of Australia’s system of superannuation, see Bateman, Kingston and Piggott 
(2001).  For a detailed analysis of the compulsory nature of the system, see Bateman and Piggott 
(1999). 
 
5   The number of regulatory changes made to Australia’s superannuation system exceeded 2,000 in the 




 The SCP paradigm, pioneered by Mason (1939, 1949), provides a useful tool in analysing 
industrial organisation, offering a rationale for the existence and profitability of an 
industry that fails to offer consistent value for its customers.
6  Although traditional 
economic models can, at times, be difficult to identify in the real world; the SCP model of 
industrial organisation and firm behaviour is designed to elucidate a causal relationship 
between an industry”s characteristics and composition, the conduct of individual firms 
within that industry, and their resultant performance, with associated outcomes for the 
consumer. 
 
The SCP paradigm provides a useful methodology to explore the retail superannuation 
fund industry in Australia.  Previous studies have explored the extent to which 
superannuation funds have delivered satisfactory investment performance
7, the skill of 
individual fund managers
8, and conduct-related characteristics, such as investment and 
administration costs.
9  The results of these studies suggest risk-adjusted returns from the 
retail superannuation market fail to exceed that of a passive alternative.  However, while 
these studies provide important empirical insights into industry performance, they offer 
little in the way of a causal relationship between industry structure, conduct and 
investment performance.  We commence our discussion with a stylised SCP analysis of 
Australia”s current superannuation arrangements presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
The SCP Paradigm and the Australian Retail Superannuation Fund Industry 
Australia”s Retail Superannuation Industry 
Characteristic Evidence  Citation 
Structure 
Government Regulation Highly  regulated, 
increasingly complex. 
Bateman, Kingston and 
Piggott (2001), Clitheroe 
(2001). 
Taxes and Subsidies  Concessionally taxed at 
15%. 
Gallery, Brown and Gallery 
(1996), Knox (2003). 
Macroeconomic Policies  Strongly encouraged.  APRA (2003). 
Elasticity of Demand  Highly inelastic.  Bateman and Piggott 
(1999), Beaman (2003). 
Rate of Growth  Strong, relatively stable 
growth. 
Abbott (2004). 
Number of Buyers and 
Sellers 
Many buyers and a stable 
number of sellers. 
Bateman (2002), Drew and 
Stanford (2003c). 
Barriers to Entry  High (particularly due to 
regulation). 
APRA (2003). 
                                                      
6    Mason’s original theory has been developed by Bain (1959), Clarke (1961) and Caves (1972), with 
Scherer (1979) and Scherer and Ross (1990).  The SCP approach undertaken in this study reflects the 
work of these more recent authors. 
 
7    Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003), for example, find that retail and industry funds have the lowest 
returns of the various types of superannuation fund.  Drew and Stanford (2003c) undertake a multi-
factor asset pricing evaluation of retail superannuation funds. 
 
8   Gallagher (2001) and Drew, Veeraghavan and Wilson (2002) report limited positive selection or timing 
ability for Australian superannuation fund managers. 
 
9   Clare (2001) analyses the costs associated with various types of superannuation funds.  Drew (2003) 





Product Differentiation  Only slightly differentiated 
products. 
Clements and Drew (2004). 
Pricing Behaviour  Above marginal cost.  Clare (2001), Drew (2003). 
Advertising  High levels of advertising 
and marketing, particularly 




Product Quality  Poor to average.  Gallagher (2001), Coleman, 
Esho and Wong (2003), 
Drew and Stanford (2003c). 
Allocative and 
Productive Efficiency 
Poor to average.  Gallery, Brown and Gallery 
(1996), Bateman (2002), 
Drew (2003). 
Price  Above marginal cost.  Clare (2001), Drew and 
Stanford (2003). 
 
The preponderance of international studies has indicated poor risk-adjusted performance 
by mutual funds when compared with a passive benchmark over the last fifty years.
10  As 
a result of this persistent poor performance, the funds management industry lends itself 
to an exploration using the traditional SCP paradigm.  As previously discussed, this 
framework is utilised by Otten and Schweitzer (2002) to compare the mutual funds 
industries in Europe and the United States of America, and by Davis and Steil (2001) in 
their treatise on institutional investors.  The premise of these contributions is that poor 
risk-adjusted performance is the direct result of specific structural and behavioural 
characteristics, which may be generic or industry- and country-specific.
11  Given this 
international evidence, it is timely to consider one of the fastest growing fund-types, 
namely retail funds, in light of the structure, conduct and performance of Australia”s 
superannuation arrangements. 
Structure 
Superannuation is the primary retirement savings vehicle in Australia.  Pension schemes 
in the United States
12, the United Kingdom
13, New Zealand and the majority of European 
                                                      
10   Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996) and Wermers (2000) have found evidence 
to support Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis in analyses of fund manager performance across a 
number of markets and time periods.  In the UK, Blake (1989) and Blake and Timmerman (1998) report 
similar findings. 
 
11   After being rejected several times over a six-year period, the superannuation choice legislation allowing 
employees to choose where their employer contributions will be invested was passed in the Senate in 
late June 2004.  Bateman (2002), Drew and Stanford (2002, 2003b) and Clements and Drew (2004), for 
example, have considered the debate regarding member choice of fund.  We will return to this most 
important of issues in the concluding remarks section of the paper. 
 
12   Baldwin (2004) provides an interesting discussion of the shift away from defined benefit pensions in the 
US to voluntary arrangements through the use of 401k plans. 
 
13  Johnson (1998) provides a historical guide to the changes in the UK pension system and the current 
environment, estimating that approximately 75% of employees in 1998 were covered by a voluntary 





14 are characterised by voluntary or consensual arrangements between employers 
and employees; superannuation in Australia is unique in the international sphere due to 
the involuntary or contractual nature of membership.  Although superannuation had been 
in existence since the 1920s
15, the introduction of the SGL in the 1991 Federal Budget 
required that employers provide a prescribed level of superannuation support to the vast 
majority of employees, resulting in the contemporary “three-pillar” approach to retirement 
incomes policy (age pension, compulsory superannuation and voluntary retirement income 
savings). 
In the Australian setting, there are five types of superannuation fund.
16  Retail 
superannuation funds, the focus of this study, dominate the marketplace in terms of 
membership and investment assets; and are most accessible to those with choice.  
Corporate, industry and public sector funds rarely offer membership to non-employees; 
small funds (commonly known as “self managed” or “do-it-yourself [DIY]” funds) have 
ongoing costs of approximately AUD 1,500 to 2,000 per annum, and are therefore 
prohibitively expensive for most investors (equating to an administrative charge in excess 
of 2% per annum on an average balance of AUD 70,000 and excluding transaction costs 
associated with the investment of the monies).  Within the existing structure of the 
superannuation industry, retail funds offer the most cost-effective and accessible vehicle 
for employees who are not bound to an existing employer-sponsored fund. 
 
Table 2 - Superannuation Fund Type (as at September 2003) 







Corporate  1,759 1,107  59 
Industry 104  7,691  59 
Public Sector  73  3,001  111 
Retail  231 13,066 186 
Small Funds
  275,523 511  118 
Total 277,690  25,376  533 
NB: Fund numbers are preliminary based upon 2001–02 returns. 
Source: APRA (2003) 
 
The domination of the retail superannuation, comprising 34% of total superannuation 
assets, is expected to continue, and possibly increase (APRA, 2003).  Retail 
                                                      
14   Anderson (2004) provides a comparison of compulsory state-funded pension arrangements in Sweden 
with voluntary private sector arrangements in Denmark and the Netherlands; Disney (2003) provides a 
review of pension arrangements and structural reform in twelve European nations plus the US and New 
Zealand. 
 
15  The Superannuation Fund Management Board was established in 1922 under the Superannuation Act 
1922 to deal with the administration and management of the first superannuation scheme for 
Commonwealth employees.  Other voluntary arrangements between employers and employees were 
later established under the Act. 
 
16   Superannuation funds are defined in the following way by the regulatory authority, APRA: 1. Corporate funds which are 
sponsored by a single non-government employer or group of employers; 2. Industry funds which are established under 
an award or agreement; 3. Public sector funds which are sponsored by government employers or by government 
business enterprises; 4. Retail funds which are pooled super products marketed by intermediaries to the general public; 
they include master trusts and personal superannuation products offered by life insurance companies and other 





 superannuation funds have experienced asset growth of more than 250% and a doubling 
of fund membership since mid-1994, while, over the same period, members of corporate 
and public sector funds have decreased in number (APRA, 2003).  Market commentators 
suggest that retail funds will experience the highest level of growth over the next decade, 
almost tripling in value (Abbott, 2004).
17  Retail superannuation funds form the focus of 
this study due to their current dominance and future growth prospects, and for their 
portability, cost-effectiveness and accessibility to all sectors of the investment market. 
 
Conduct 
Australia”s superannuation system places constraints upon both fund managers within the 
marketplace and the retail investors” funds they manage.  This directly impacts the 
conduct of participants and the extent to which such conduct generates welfare gains to 
the investing public.  This study gives particular emphasis to the conduct of fund 
managers, with particular consideration given to the various characteristics that 
differentiate funds – style, rating and cost – to assess the value (or otherwise) of 
incorporating such information into the fund selection decision. 
 
We commence our discussion with an examination of style.  In portfolio construction, fund 
managers face myriad choices regarding asset selection – what will be the key 
characteristics of each individual stock and company in which funds will be invested?  In 
answering this question, fund managers will typically adopt criteria with which to construct 
a portfolio – these criteria are said to reflect the manager”s “investment style” or 
“investment philosophy”.
18  The style of asset selection is a broadly accepted point of 
differentiation and has recognised implications within the financial services industry in 
particular.  Industry wisdom recommends that investors not invest in a single manager to 
avoid “style bias” impacting investment returns.  Financial planners suggest a strategy of 
diversifying across styles to minimise the impact of holding a “Value” manager when 
“Growth” stocks outperform the market.
19  We will test these differentiation points in the 
following section. 
 
Style is frequently used by superannuation fund managers to differentiate their products 
and attract funds inflow; the information surrounding style, however, can be esoteric and 
has, in the Australian context, largely lacked empirical evidence linking investment 
process and performance.  As investors seek to maximise the return on their capital, 
alternative sources of information are regularly sought as a predictor or indicator of future 
performance potential.  As a result of this information asymmetry, the use of ratings is 
now common practice in industry (Beaman, 2003; Gerrans, 2004, 2006).  Fund manager 
ratings, as provided by research houses, are the result of reviews of each manager”s 
capabilities in terms of criteria such as personnel, risk-management, investment 
processes, and business management.
20  These reviews are then distilled to a single 
rating (such as a  or alphabetical system) or ranking system (such as “Top 5 Australian 
                                                      
17   It is also postulated that the implementation of the employee choice of fund legislation is likely to increase the demand 
for retail superannuation investment services: see Drew and Clements (2004). 
 
18   See Damodaran (2002) for a guide to investment styles.  Varying investment styles in the portfolio may also provide 
opportunities for mean-variance efficient investors. 
 
19   For a complete discussion on the identification and impact of mutual fund styles, see Brown and Goetzmann (1997). 
 




 Equity Fund Managers”), with the latter frequently published as a more user-friendly 
version of the former.
21,22  This study considers whether such ratings are “information-
rich” regarding the quality of the manager, given the accessibility of this information, and 
the relatively low cost to the end user, 
 
The final area of differentiation considered in this study relates to cost.  The standard cost 
structure for the retail superannuation funds industry (consistent with the managed funds 
industry in Australia and the mutual funds industry internationally) involves the imposition 
of entry and/or exit loads, and an ongoing cost to the investor, termed the Management 
Expense Ratio (MER).
23  Entry (exit) loads are deducted from the investor”s balance at the 
date of investment (redemption), and in Australia can be up to 5.5%.
24  The MER is levied 
as a fixed percentage of funds under management, and is deducted from the investment 
return.
25  The MER is therefore independent of fund manager performance, and is used in 
this study as a determination of quality – specifically, we consider the extent to which the 
investor receives “value” for the cost of the fund manager”s services.
26
D D Da a at t ta a a     C C Co o ol l ll l le e ec c ct t ti i io o on n n     
Data for this study were provided by the independent agency, van Eyk Research (vER) 
Limited.  vER is Australia”s largest funds management research house, providing research 
services to investors, financial planners and the broader financial services industry.  It has 
been estimated that around two-thirds of financial planners in Australia utilise vER”s 
published research when advising their clients.
27
 
Single-sector or “boutique” funds, managing portfolios of Australian equities, were 
selected for analysis in this study, reflecting the importance of this asset class.  Australian 
equities are the “growth driver” of superannuation portfolios and dominate the asset 
selection choice of investors in Australia – accounting for over 45% of all superannuation 
assets (APRA 2003).  The original sample included the monthly returns net of MER (but 
excluding entry and exit loads) of 411 funds (category specifications: “Australian Equities 
– Non Specialist Superannuation – Retail) for the period 1991 to 2003.  The 
commencement of the sample period reflects the announcement of superannuation 
                                                      
21   Generally these ratings are available to retail investors through direct subscription, newspaper or special-interest 
magazines, or through a dealer group which subscribes; fund managers who receive positive ratings will also regularly 
cite their results in marketing and advertising material. 
 
22   See Beaman (2003) for discussions regarding the important role of research houses in Australia. 
 
23   At the retail level, the MER usually includes some form of ongoing commission, regardless of whether the client was 
introduced to the product by a licensed advisor.  Where the product was purchased from an online broker, for example, 
the broking house receives this commission. 
 
24   www.irate.vaneyk.com.au provides a comprehensive listing of entry and exit loads for Australian managed funds, 
including those in the retail superannuation industry.  Commission payable from entry and exit loads can be up to (and 
in rare cases, exceed) 5%. 
 
25   For example, a fund manager who generates a gross return of 8% per annum, while charging costs of 2% per annum, 
will credit 6% to the investor’s account on an annualised basis. 
 
26   Some funds include a performance fee in addition to the MER, although these are difficult to disclose, and therefore 
discouraged by the regulator.  None of the funds in the retail Australian equity superannuation marketplace included 
performance fees for the period of analysis in this study. 
 




 arrangements in the 1991 Federal Budget.  Following Gruber (1996), to mimimise the 
problem of survivorship bias, all funds, including terminated funds during this observation 
period, were included in the data collection.  The initial sample, however, included 
duplications and funds incorrectly specified (such as those investing purely in cash or 
property trusts, and diversified funds). 
 
28  The initial sample was reduced further through the removal of funds with limited return 
histories (n < 30 months), resulting in a final sample of 181 funds.  Summary statistics 
from the final sample are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Summary Statistics 
Fund Status  Open 68 
  Closed 61 
 Finalised  52 
Asset Allocation  Mean Cash Holding  1.77% 
 Mean  Australian  Equities  96.18% 




 Maximum  $20,000 
 Minimum  Nil 
NB: Approximately 1% of the balance of the fund sample is not accounted for in asset 
allocation.  For the purposes of this study, this discrepancy has been assumed to be 
invested in cash. 
The style classifications used in this study have also been obtained from vER.  vER do not 
accept style definitions from fund managers themselves, but determine such 
classifications independently 
.
30  One of the limitations of the study is that the ratings provided by vER and the fees 
charged by the fund as at 2003 are assumed constant over the observation  
period.  An interesting direction for future research would be to construct a time-series of 
such data. 
                                                      
28   The Advance Conservative Equity Fund, for example, had less than 15% of its assets invested in Australian equities, 
with the remainder invested in cash (30%), property (30%) and fixed interest (25%), and was therefore excluded from 
the data set.  For the purposes of the study, funds sampled were also required to have performance data of 30 months 
or more.  Australian Skandia Global Super Solutions and Skandia One Super, for example, are relatively recent 
offerings (with fourteen and five months of data respectively), and therefore the twenty-seven separate Australian 
equity fund options available via these mastertrusts were excluded. 
 
29   The majority of retail superannuation funds specify a minimum initial investment.  Balances of less than $1,000 are 
legally protected against erosion through fees which provides a significant disincentive for retail funds to accept 
particularly small rollovers or one-off contributions.  Minimum balance requirements are often waived where the investor 
commits to making regular contributions via a direct debit arrangement. 
 
30   The vER style definitions are described as follows: Growth: This style favours investment in companies that have the 
capacity to sustain future growth in earnings and are generally regarded as quality companies; Value: This style is 
typically less concerned about the growth component when assessing the valuation and will often include companies 
with less reliable prospects; GARP: Typically the GARP style is a subset of the Growth, GARP stands for Growth At a 
Reasonable Price; Style Neutral: Style neutral managers are those that attempt to manager their portfolios with a 
balance of growth and value styles; Rotational: Rotational managers are those that will shift their emphasis to/from 
Growth to Value companies when they see opportunity and/or risks; and, Multi-Manager: Multi-manager portfolios are 





 Table 4 - Style Characteristics 
Style  Number of Funds  Proportion (%) 
Growth 21  11.6 
Value 29  16.0 
GARP 49  27.1 
Style Neutral  23  12.7 
Rotational 0  0.0 
Multimanager 23  12.7 
Moderately Active  3  1.7 
Unspecified 17  9.4 
Unknown 16  8.8 
Total 181  100 
 
Fund manager ratings are considered a significant determinant of fund flows, and are an 
important characteristic considered by investors when choosing where to invest their 
superannuation assets.
31  The following ratings included in this study for the funds were 
provided by vER. 
Table 5 - Rating Characteristics 
Rating  Number of Funds  Proportion (%) 
AA Rating  1  0.6 
A Rating  32  17.7 
B Rating  71  39.2 
H (Hold) Rating  10  5.5 
FW (Fund Watch)  0  0.0 
Not Rated  67  37.0 
Total 181  100 
 
 For the purposes of this study, cost has been defined as the MER of the fund, which is 
designed to take account of ongoing fund costs and fees.  The MER does not include entry 
or exit loads (immediate or deferred), buy-sell spreads and switching fees.  It should, 
however, include all other anticipated ongoing costs to the fund member.  Those funds 
                                                      
31   The vER style definitions are described as follows: AA: Very high confidence of the manager adding value relative to 
competitors over a full investment cycle (usually 3–5 years) within the guidelines specified by their investment style.  
Tracking error is actively controlled and the style should add value in most market conditions. Recommended Manager; 
A: High confidence in the manager adding value relative to competitors over a full investment cycle (usually 3–5 years) 
within the guidelines specified by their investment style.  The tracking error is actively controlled; however, on a 
comparative basis there are some weaknesses in the process, people or organisation.  Recommended Manager; B: 
There is less certainty that the manager would add value relative to competitors over the full investment cycle.   
Alternatively, in our opinion this manager is not in the top quartile of managers due to a lower rating of some key 
aspects of their organisation.  If the client has a long-term timeframe they should consider switching to an A or AA rated 
manager on review.  Average Manager; H (Hold): A manager under aspects of change.  Keep under review, but do not 
add further funds.  FW (Fund Watch): The fund has a poor risk return trade off and the ability to add value relative to 
competitors is difficult to discern.  Alternatively there are problems, disruptions or uncertainties that could lead to poor 
investment returns in the future.  Withdraw funds subject to a review of the costs of doing so.  Fund Watch; and, NR: Not 
rated.  It is important to note that vER state “…our assessment of ability to add value relative to competitors is based to 
a significant degree on our analysis of the managers’ capabilities and specialisation and whether these will be useful in 





 without MER information were assumed to have the same ongoing expenses as those 
within the same service or pool of funds.
32  Table 6 below provides summary statistics for 
the costs associated with the pool of funds examined in this study. 
Table 6 - Cost Characteristics 
Expense Type 
MER Mean  2.1% 
 Maximum  3.1% 
 Minimum  0.9% 
   
Entry Fee  Mean  3.3% 
 Maximum  6.0% 
 Minimum  0.0% 
 With  133 
 Without  48 
   
Exit Fee  Mean  0.6% 
 Maximum  5.5% 
 Minimum  0.0% 
   
Ongoing Commission  Mean  0.5% 
 Maximum  1.1% 
  Minimum  0.0% 
NB: For comparative purposes, all entry fees have been assumed to include GST.  This 
may not be the case, however, and also will not apply to those funds closed or finalised 
prior to 30
 June 2000. 
 
A number of mastertrusts differentiate between “administration fees” and “fund manager 
fees”, and report MERs which are significantly lower than the market average, as ongoing 
administrative fees have not been taken into consideration.  Where the fund administrator 
has chosen to impose several types of ongoing fees on a single account, these costs have 
been combined to produce a single fee representative of the normal ongoing fees levied 
upon the consumer account.  For instance, the AMP Flexible Lifetime Super Fund charges 
an MER of only 0.3% for its AMP Australian Equities option; however, an additional 
administration fee of 1.55% is also levied upon the account.  For the purposes of this 
study, therefore, the applicable MER for this fund is 1.85% per annum.
33
A A An n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s     
This study evaluates the asset selection abilities of superannuation fund managers 
specialising in the area of Australian equities, and the extent to which the differentiating 
factors of style, rating and cost can assist the retail investor in selecting a fund that offers 
quality over the medium to long term.  The primary findings of this study are that fund 
                                                      
32  For example, the AXA Retirement Plan – Australian Equities had an MER of 1.95%.  The AXA Retirement Plan – 
Australian Equities Mature fund had no reported MER.  In this instance, 1.95% was taken as a proxy for the MER of the 
latter fund.  This is a limitation of the study. 
33   Additionally, there is some discrepancy between those funds for which commissions are included in the MER, and those 
for which commissions are not.  Of the 181 funds within the sample, fifteen (15) funds had no advisor commission built 
in to the MER, and data regarding commission payable was not available for a further fifteen of the funds.  For those 
funds without full information, it was assumed that commission was built in to the ongoing expenses of the fund; for 
those funds without a commission payable, the MER was taken as reported.  As advisors may add trailing commissions 
to the fund’s expense ratio, it is possible that MERs have been under-stated for 15 of the 181 funds in the sample 




 managers, on average, fail to outperform a passive alternative.  While this finding 
supports a long line of domestic and international studies, the interesting result in the 
following analysis is that we report very limited evidence of differentiation across funds, 
with factors such as style, rating and cost providing limited information in regard to the 
issue of fund quality. 
 
The study relies on three asset pricing techniques to evaluate manager performance.  
Jensen”s (1968) risk-adjusted single factor model is used to determine whether funds out 
– or under-perform the relevant benchmark index.  Treynor-Mazuy”s (1966) quadratic 
model is then employed to determine the extent to which managers demonstrate timing 
ability in addition to superior (or inferior) asset selection.  Finally, Ferson and Schadt”s 
(1996) conditional model is employed, which incorporates the dynamic asset selection 
decisions made by managers on the basis of public information variables (including 
dividend yield and bond rates), over the investment cycle.  The results of these models 
are then juxtaposed with the differentiating factors of style, rating and cost using simple 
sorting techniques to elucidate relationships (if any) between these factors and alpha (as 
a proxy for fund manager skill).  We commence our analysis with Jensen”s (1968) single 
index model. 
Table 7 - Single Factor Model Estimates 
The following table reports pooled regression estimates from Jensen”s (1968) 
single index model.  The adjusted R-squared statistic is included to provide an 
indication of the predictive power of the model, and the Durbin-Watson statistic 
is included to detect first order serial- or autocorrelation.  The All Ordinaries 
accumulation index is used as the benchmark, with the Reserve Bank of Australia 
13-week treasury note used as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return.  The 
sample consists of 181 retail Australian equity superannuation funds, measured 
over the period July 1991 to June 2003 on a monthly basis.  The single index 
model is given by Rit – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) + εi.  The intercept term, αi, 
provides a measure of manager ability in the area of asset selection.  Standard 
errors were obtained by using White”s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance 
matrix estimator. 
Alpha (α) -0.49%  (annualised) 
(t=-0.37) 
Standard Error  0.21 
Beta (β)  0.88 
(t=23.84) 
Standard Error  0.17 
R
2 Adjusted  0.76 
Durbin Watson Statistic  2.07 
 
The funds considered in this study, on average, exhibited negative alpha of 0.4866% per 
annum, under-performing the passive alternative by approximately 50 basis points (bps) 
on a risk-adjusted basis annually.  This estimate, however, is not significant even at the 
10% level, and therefore the null hypothesis that alpha is equal to zero cannot be 
rejected.  These findings are consistent with those of Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996) and 
Wermers (2000) at the international level and, in the Australian funds management 
context, with those of Sawicki (2000), Gallagher (2001), Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003) 
and Drew and Stanford (2003c).  Cost is particularly relevant in this discussion, as it 
provides some guide as to the industry”s ability to exploit superior information.  Given an 
average MER of 2.08% per annum, and underperformance of approximately 0.5%, the 
performance of funds before fees may be considered above average by approximately 
 
 
 1.5% – to this extent it is possible that managers do have superior information and stock 
selection skills.  However, the cost of obtaining and utilising this information is greater 
than the advantage it conveys to the investor.  This is consistent with the findings of Drew 
and Stanford (2003c) in the Australian context and Gruber (1996, 2001) at the 
international level.  For the retail investor, the presence of superior asset selection ability 
on the part of fund managers on a pre-cost basis is redundant – the various strategies 
employed by the fund managers in this sample, on average, do not appear to add value to 
investor portfolios on a net basis.  Were it possible for investors to access very low-cost or 
wholesale managers, however, there remains the potential for value to be added by the 
funds management industry. 
Table 8 - Distribution of Single-Factor Model Estimates 
The following table reports the number of alphas that were not different from 
zero (Zero column), and those significantly different from zero under the Positive 
or Negative columns for a total number of 181 retail Australian equity 
superannuation funds examined in this study.  The number of betas not different 
from one (or unity) (Unity column) and those significantly different from unity 
(Greater than/Less than Unity columns) are reported.  These estimates are 
considered at the 5% and 10% significance levels.  The mean alpha and beta 
estimates are again provided for the entire sample. 
Alphas for Individual Managed Funds 
 Significanc
e Level 
Zero Positive  Negative  Total 
Mean 
Alpha 
5% 159  4  18 181  All Ords 
Accum 
Index  10% 145  9  27  181 
-0.49 













5% 5  6  170  181  All Ords 
Accum 
Index  10% 6  6 169  181 
0.88 
 
The existence of betas significantly less than one suggests that, as an industry, a 
relatively conservative approach to portfolio composition has been adopted by fund 
managers over this period.  Managers appear to concentrate their asset selection in the 
larger capitalisation stocks, minimising the volatility commonly associated with smaller 
companies, which may account for some reduction in systematic risk.
34
The results from the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) quadratic model are broadly similar to 
those of Jensen”s single-factor model above.
35  Funds are estimated to generate negative 
                                                      




35   Two important corrections have been incorporated in the Treynor-Mazuy quadratic model for the purposes of this study.  
Firstly, the use of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (and associated heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics) 
was employed in order to minimise the possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis in the event of significant timing ability 
and vice versa. Secondly, as multicollinearity has been revealed in similar studies (for instance, Chapman and Pearson, 
2000), the technique of orthogonal polynomials was employed, transforming the squared excess return variable with a 
dummy variable.  The transformed equation is shown as: Rit = αi + βiRmt + λipt(Rmt)
2 + εi, where pt(Rmt) is formed as the 
regression residual of Rmt
2 and DRmt onto a constant, and scaled to have a standard deviation equal to the standard 
 
 alpha of -0.04 per month (-0.47% per annum).  Again, this pooled result is not significant 
at the 5% or 10% level.  Given these results, and their similarity to those generated using 
the single factor model, it provides corroborating evidence that managers, given current 
high fee structures, are unlikely to outperform a low-cost buy-and-hold strategy. 
Table 9 - Quadratic Model Estimates 
The following table reports pooled regression estimates from Treynor and Mazuy”s 
(1966) quadratic market model.  The quadratic market model is given by Rit = αi + 
βiRmt + λiRmt
2 + εi.  The intercept term, αi, provides a measure of manager ability in 













Standard Error  2.08 
R
2 Adjusted  0.77 
Durbin Watson Statistic  2.04 
Table 10 - Distribution of Quadratic Model Estimates 
The following table shows the distribution of estimated alphas, betas and lambdas.   
These funds are examined at the 5% and 10% significance levels.  The mean alpha, beta 
and lambda estimates are again given for the entire sample. 
 
Alphas for Individual Managed Funds 
 Significance 
Level 
Zero Positive  Negative  Total 
Mean 
Alpha 
5% 159  4  18 181  All Ords 
Accum 
Index  10% 145  9  27  181 
-0.47 
 








Total Mean  Beta 
5% 4  6  171  181  All Ords 
Accum 
Index  10% 6  6 169  181 
0.79 
Lambdas for Individual Managed Funds 
 Significance 
Level 
Zero Positive  Negative  Total 
Mean 
Lambda 
5% 154  1  26 181  All Ords 
Accum 
Index  10% 135  4  42  181 
-0.37 
 
This study also finds no evidence of positive timing ability on behalf of active portfolio 
managers, with the pooled lambda coefficient estimated at -0.37% per annum.  At the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
deviation of the dependent variable Rit.  This model is used to generate the parameter estimates for the Treynor-Mazuy 




 individual fund level, 26 of the 181 funds (14% of the sample population) were found to 
have significantly perverse timing ability at the 5% level.  At the international level, the 
results are consistent with those of Henrikkson (1984) and Coggin, Gabozzi and Rahman 
(1993), who fail to find evidence of superior market timing ability, and with studies in 
Australia by Sinclair (1990), Hallahan and Faff (1999) and Drew, Veeraraghavan and 
Wilson (2005). 
 
Table 11 - Conditional Model Estimates 
The following table reports pooled regression estimates from the Ferson 
and Schadt (1996) conditional multi-factor model.  The conditional factors 
used are the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Dividend Yield and 
Commonwealth Government of Australia 1- and 10-year bond rates.  
Following Ferson and Schadt (1996) the choice of the loading on the 
market factor by the fund manager, at time t, is assumed to follow a 
linear functional form with respect to the information available at time t.  
The conditional multi-factor model takes the form Rpt+1 = αp + γ1p Rrmt+1 
+ γ”2p(ztrmt+1) + εpt+1.  The intercept term, αi, provides a measure of 
manager ability in the area of asset selection.  Standard errors were 
obtained by using White”s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix 
estimator.  
 
Alpha (α) -0.89%  (annualised) 
(t=-0.52) 
Standard Error  0.23 
R
2 Adjusted  0.79 
Durbin Watson Statistic  2.10 
 
 
A model allowing systematic risk to be conditional (Ferson and Schadt, 1996) suggests 
greater underperformance by the industry than previous models (-89 bps per annum).  
This indicates that once public information variables, specifically bond rates (1- and 10-
year Commonwealth Government bonds) and dividend yield, are taken into account, 
managers are less able to generate abnormal returns.  Such results are broadly consistent 
with the international studies of Ferson and Schadt (1996) and the Australian samples of 
Sawicki and Ong (2000) and Clements and Drew (2004).  Interestingly, regardless of the 
asset pricing model used to evaluate performance, the quantum of under–performance 
was consistently less than the MER charged. 
The results presented thus far suggest that, as an industry, managers do not generate 
positive alpha using single-factor, quadratic or conditional models to estimate risk-
adjusted performance.  We now turn our attention to areas of potential fund 
differentiation – style, rating and cost – to examine whether such variables are 
“information rich” to the potential investor.  The following tables sort Jensen”s (1968) 
alpha estimates across the various differentiating factors.
36
 
                                                      
36   In order to ensure the robustness of the tests, the alphas estimated from all of the asset pricing models used in this 




 Table 12 - Style and Alpha Sort 
The following table sorts alpha against manager style (as defined by 
VER) in ascending order.  It is important to note that the results 
reports are arithmetic averages with, for instance, the “moderately 
active” category having only three observations. 
Manager Style  Mean Alpha 
(Annual) 
t-Statistic 
Style Neutral  -1.10  -1.47 
GARP -0.99  -0.44 
Unknown -0.88  -0.52 
Growth -0.87  -0.35 
Unspecified -0.82  -0.12 
Multi-Manager -0.78  -0.44 
Moderately Active  -0.67  -0.49 
Value 1.80  0.62 
Mean   -0.49  -0.37 
 
When sorted by style using alpha estimates from Jensen”s (1968) single factor model, all 
managers, except those employing a Value style, generated negative alpha.  The Value 
style managers demonstrated superior asset selectivity, generating positive alpha of 
almost 1.8% per annum net of fees and expenses, however this alpha is not significant at 
either the 5 or 10 % levels.  It should also be noted that these findings may be related to 
the period of the sample.  Although the sample period covers twelve years, including a 
prolonged bull market followed by a significant correction, the period 2000 to 2003 was 
considered to be particularly favourable to “value” managers.  In the tech boom of 1999 
to 2000, value managers significantly under-performed the market, for instance, both the 
“Tyndall Australian Value Trust” and the “Maple-Brown Abbott Australian Equity Fund”, 
two of the best performing managers over the sample period, were in the bottom quartile 
for this two–year period.  Had this study been undertaken for the period 1990 to 2000, for 
example, it is quite likely that “value” managers would have demonstrated little positive 
out-performance. 
Table 13 - Rating and Alpha Sort 
The following table sorts alpha against Rating (as defined by vER) in 
ascending order. 
Rating Mean  Alpha 
(Annual) 
t-Statistic 
AA -1.63  -0.31 
B -1.07  -0.53 
Not Rated  -0.84  -0.43 
A 0.84  -0.15 
H 1.89  0.45 
Mean   -0.49  -0.37 
 
As discussed previously, fund ratings are an important tool increasingly used by investors 
and advisors alike in the fund selection process.  Both sets of funds with an “A” rating, 
and those on “H” (hold), generated positive alpha using the single factor model; those 
funds with “AA” or “B” ratings, and those that were unrated, had negative alphas.  These 
 
 
 findings do not indicate a positive relationship between the fund rating and its potential 
for out-performance.  However, one of the primary reasons for the “H” rating applied to 
funds which have out-performed may be that they are no longer open to retail investors.  
For instance, the Tyndall Australian Value Trust, one of the best performing funds in the 
sample, is now closed through various mastertrusts, and therefore cannot be purchased 
by new investors.  These findings are somewhat consistent with those of Blake and Morey 
(2000), who found that low rated funds were likely to suffer from relatively poor future 
performance using various asset pricing techniques in the US, and with the work of 
Gerrans (2006) in Australia.  Blake and Morey (2000) did find, however, that there was 
little correlation between the highest-rated, the next-to-highest, and the median-rated 
funds and their relative performance.  Their ultimate finding was that “…ratings, at best, 
do only slightly better than alternative predictors in forecasting future fund performance” 
(p.451).  To this extent, the findings of this study are consistent with this argument; 
however, these results must be viewed in light of sorting by the 2003 rating only. 
 
Table 14 
Cost and Alpha Sort 
The following table sorts alpha against Fund Cost (or MER) (as recorded by 







Top Quartile   2.6158  -0.045  -0.13 
Second Quartile  2.1312  -1.33  -0.64 
Third Quartile  1.9138  0.15  -0.10 
Bottom Quartile  1.5847  -0.73  -0.65 
Mean   2.08%  -0.49  -0.37 
 
Turning to the issue of fund costs, those funds with MERs in the third quartile produced 
positive alpha, while the remaining funds (those with the highest, above average and 
lowest MERs) appeared to generate inferior selection ability.
37  These findings are 
consistent with those of Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003) and Drew and Stanford (2003) 
to the extent that higher costs do not necessarily result in better performance.  Investors 
may conclude that an increase in costs is not rewarded with a commensurate increase in 
performance.   
C C Co o on n nc c cl l lu u us s si i io o on n n     
The SCP paradigm proposes that the structural characteristics of an industry lead to 
specific firm behaviour which in turn influences performance and consumer outcomes.  
The structure of Australia”s retail superannuation fund industry is characterised by 
detailed regulation, increasing complexity and high demand for funds management 
services.  Within this environment, funds managers appear to conform to a 
                                                      
37   To the extent that each quartile according to cost was found to have an alpha insignificant from zero, these findings 
were robust across each of the models.  The quadratic and conditional multi-factor models, however, illustrated a more 
direct link between cost and performance, with the most expensive funds generating the highest level of 
underperformance, and the least expensive managers actually generating positive, if insignificant, alpha.  Again, it is 





 monopolistically competitive market structure leading to suboptimal outcomes for 
investors – despite a plethora of retail funds from which to choose. 
 
The results presented in this study have immediate implications for all stakeholders in 
Australia”s superannuation system, the Federal Government, funds managers and 
investors alike.  The results suggest that system structure and industry conduct in the 
retail fund segment, have resulted in fee structures which erode completely any alpha 
accretive decisions made by fund managers, to the detriment of investors.  In light of 
these seemingly unavoidable costs, investors are best served seeking out those retail 
funds with the lowest cost structures when selecting a manager to invest their retirement 
savings with. 
 
Turning to the characteristics which may differentiate fund alternatives –style, rating and 
cost – there is little hard evidence in this study that any of these characteristics is 
information rich regarding the quality of the fund.  The results for the Australian retail 
superannuation setting support the findings of previous work considering the United 
States and European funds management industries, in linking structure and conduct to 
industry performance.  As Australia embarks on a policy of more complete choice of 
superannuation fund and portability of superannuation balances, the analysis presented in 
this study suggests that the success of such systemic reforms will be directly linked to the 
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